Special Vehicle Operations: An Activity-Based Plan for Improving the Automotive Vehicle Development Process by Scott, Gregory
# W-0178a
(IMVP Restricted)
‘\\,
\
Special Vehicle Operations:
An Activity-Based Plan for
Improving the Automotive
Vehicle Development Process
Gregory K. Scott*
Doctoral Candidate
Behavioral Sciences, Area
Organization Studies Group
Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
This brief paper considers the New Product Development (NPD)
strategies and practices recently employed by the Ford Motor Company as
a base for a substantial, near-term improvement in automotive vehicle
development performance. The recognition of current industry “best
practices” in lean design and manufacturing coupled with consumer
desires for niche vehicles provides an opportunity to significantly reduce
the time-to-market for new vehicle designs. This paper proposes that a
Special Vehicle Operations plant be established as an ongoing facility to
develop and manufacture technology demonstration vehicles for corporate
research use and public sale. Such a facility, a manufacturing “proving
ground” akin to vehicle test facilities, would support the more rapid
introduction of advanced vehicle technologies by routinizing design
experiments in a quasi-mass production setting. The expected result
would be a steadier and more continuous introduction of advanced
processes into mainstream products. The scheduling, technical, financial,
and quality risks inherent to such introductions would be lessened as well.
The research foundation of this paper is an International Motor Vehicle
Program-sponsored repofl supe~ised by Professor Michael Cusumano of
MIT on the NPD practices under implementation by the Ford Motor
Company. Other prima~ source materials include articles on advanced
product development initiatives taking place in the automobile industry.
lPlease address any and all comments to:
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50 Memorial Drive, Room E52-501, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02142
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Introduction
Many recent public accounts have trumpeted the “rebirth” of the American
automobile industry. Repofls of strong new vehicle sales and record profits may lead
the casual observer to the belief that US automakers are firmly in control of their own
destinies, able to put forth continued streams of excellent products and to reap
increased global market share. [n both business and product development terms, this
view is suspect.
Much of this nation’s “newfound” market strength is the result of events outside
the manufacturers’ control and prediction such as large foreign exchange rate
movements and tectonic market demand shifts to minivans, sport utility vehicles and
light trucks. While the exchange rate effects may likely persist for some time, foreign
firms are coping by reducing costs and in some cases content on their offerings while
maintaining their customers’ quality and value expectations. Foreign firms, the
Japanese and Germans in particular, are also relying more heavily on operations
outside their home countries to reduce production expenses. As to shifts in market
demand, Chrysler’s success in popularizing the minivan has spurred that vehicle
segment globally. The substantial growth in sales of sport utility vehicles and light
trucks allows US firms to exploit a product area that has been uniquely American for
many years. That market dominance is not guaranteed for the foreseeable future, and
is increasingly being challenged on a variety of design fronts and vehicle price points.
US firms have, to their credit, made diligent effotis to lessen their costs and narrow a
substantial design and manufacturing gap with their most able foreign competitors, the
Japanese. Closing this gap is not enough to ensure continued prosperity given cyclical
market downturns that will surely occur.
With the exception of a few development projects, US automakers generally are
considered to lag behind their best competitors in new product development
performance. In terms of time to market for new products, the cost and engineering
hours expended, new-model production changeovers, and the ability to leverage
component systems and platforms across multiple projects, American firms are still not
the world’s best.
This paper attempts to address one means by which an automotive firm, or any
business which manufactures large volumes of highly engineered products, can attempt
to substantially strengthen its product development activities and competitive
positioning. It proposes setting up a dedicated product design and manufacturing
environment geared towards early adoption and market introduction of advanced
product and process technologies and techniques. By testing, refining, and routinizing
advanced methods under the pressure to produce large, yet sub-normal (for a major
automaker) volumes of saleable products, a firm applies a racing philosophy to the
production environment. Such a product development “incubator” offers many firmwide
benefits including:
Demonstration of Technological Dexterity and Leadership
Greater understanding and mntrol over the Project Cycle
Stronger Project Planning Networks Within/Without the Company
Reduced Technology Riskfor Full-Scale Production Projects
Reduced Financial Risk for Full-Scale Production Projects
More rapid progression down Production Learning Curves
A continuing stream of Halo Niche Products and Marketing Experiments
Challenges for the “best and brightest” Corporate Personnel
Such benefits are not without cost, especially in terms of redefining the
organization’s structural orientation to support agile development and manufacturing.
The decision to expend the substantial funds needed to create a special vehicle plant
must be based on more than the value of the vehicles produced. At its heart, a special
vehicle plant as described in this paper is a continuing effort to stay at the forefront of
vehicle development by routinely using, not just studying, advanced methods, then
driving proven concepts into the organization at large. Meeting this goal requires a
major investment.
The special vehicle plant goes beyond the industry habit of building “special
editions” of existing models using aftermarket parts installed on the production line or at
subcontracted supplier facilities. it goes beyond the normal practice of introducing new
component technologies as add-on options. A special vehicle plant would likely be a
cross between an industrial design house, a racing fabricator, and a highly automated,
modular assembly plant. While no major US automaker except possibly Chrysler (with
its Viper and Prowler projects) has attempted to develop an on-going capacity to build
low-to-medium volume production vehicles, a number of foreign automakers have
conducted in-house or joint venture arrangements to produce batches of highly modified
versions of their normal mass-production offerings or entirely new vehicles for racing or
2
sale. For example, BMW’s M Division produces complete specialty models, does
customization work on production models for BMW and end users, and develops
advanced engines for its own racing use and for outside firms like McLaren. British
industrialist Tom Walkinshaw produced the XJ-220 supercar under contract to Jaguar.
He is now in the process of setting up a production operation in an underutilized Volvo
plant to annually make perhaps twenty thousand coupes and convertibles based on
Volvo’s 850 series. Cosworth Engineering develops highly modified performance
versions of Ford products, is a world-class engine builder for Grand Prix and Indy Car
racing, and does advanced powertrain engineering design and development for a
number of automakers. Porsche, in addition to racing and customization work on its
own offerings, has developed and produced high-performance, specialty vehicles for
Mercedes Benz and Audi. Renault will open its Technocentre in 1996. This Parisian
facility will supporl all the company’s new vehicle development and include a pilot
factory.1 Such efforts are a good starting point for a special vehicle plant, lacking only
the commitment to radically different vehicle designs and manufacturing methods.
The challenge for a major US automaker is to develop an in-house organization
that is not just a low volume production facility geared to making a long, slow run of a
niche vehicle like the Viper. The envisioned facility must be able to deploy the most
advanced design and production processes used at any parl of the vehicle development
and manufacturing cycle while aiming to approximate the mass production environment.
The express intent is too be able to run operations at, or as close to normal production
cycle times as possible, even for ultimate production runs of no more than a few
thousand vehicles. The batches produced would be expected to vary in terms of their
differentiation from a company’s normal production. At the beginning, the vehicles
made by the new organization might reflect the addition of a major new technology such
as a hybrid chemical-electric powertrain or an active suspension, for example, to an
existing platform sourced from elsewhere in the company. Later production runs might
incorporate more fundamental changes in vehicle architecture and construction
methods, such as composite or aluminum-intensive body and chassis structure. A fully-
qualified plant could be expected to routinely turn out “clean-sheet” vehicles of its own
design.
For the purpose of this paper, the Ford Motor Company presents a suitable
candidate for such a special vehicle operation. Ford is currently undertaking an
1Norman Martin, Christopher A. Sawyer, and Marjorie Serge, “Towards World-Class.” Auiu@!&
J@@@& September 1995, p. 88.
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extensive restructuring of its vehicle operations and corporate culture known as Ford
2000. The main thrust of this effofl is to combine formerly (and formally) separate North
American and European operations into the globally-oriented Ford Automotive
Operations (FAO). Product development for FAO now takes place in five Vehicle
Centers, four in North America, one in Europe. Each Center has global responsibility for
a particular range of vehicles grouped by size/purpose and drive type. One of the major
goals is to reduce development costs by at least $2 to 3 billion annually by eliminating
duplicate engineering efforts to produce similar types of vehicles on both sides of the
Atlantic. The 1995 Harbour Report estimates that Ford spent about $785 in
development cost for each vehicle produced, much higher than Ch@er ($471) and
about forty percent more than benchmark Toyota.z Ford must diligently work to slice its
product and process costs to remain competitive.
Another element of the Ford 2000 restructuring was the creation of the
company’s Advanced Vehicle Technology (AVT) organization. AVT encompasses a
staff of approximately eleven thousand persons, and is responsible for Ford’s advanced
and production vehicle engineering, motorspods, alternative energy, and scientific
research initiatives.s It is also the home organization for Ford’s Special Vehicle Team,
an engineering group that makes limited-edition, high performance versions of existing
production models. That very organization would likely be the catalyst for an expanded
Special Vehicle Operations (SVO) activity. [The name Special Vehicle Operations was
originally used in the 1980s for an earlier Ford team that built similar high-performance
products, though on a more limited scale than the current SVT structure.]
Of the Big Three US automakers, Ford is less burdened than General Motors by
an extensive bureaucracy that hampers the creation of an interdisciplinary structure like
SVO. There are just seven management levels between first line supervisors and Ford
Chairman Alex Trotman. Ford also retains the strong central technology and research
organizations that the smaller Chtysler has de-emphasized in distributing the great
majority of its engineering resources to the platform teams and suppliers that develop its
line of vehicles. The Ford Motor Company has also been engaged in a program called
World Class Timing, an initiative intended to substantially improve its product
development operations, and one which would dovetail quite well with SVO.
2Marjorie Serge, “Editorial: Ford’s Hot SpOt,” ~ive l@@RSS , October 1995, p. 9.
3Ric Bohy,”The Invisible Power,” MtoWeek. May 1, 1995, p. 20-1.
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World Class Timing
In Fords own parlance, World Class Timing is:
a specific “plan for establishing more efficient ways of working together in
our quest to develop products that provide the highest level of satisfaction
to our customet3.4
The plan is based on a recognition that during the 1980s the time Ford took to
develop new products increased by about one quarter and that Japanese producers
were ahead of the company in terms of timing, cost, and quality. To address these
shortfalls, World Class Timing focuses on using time as a strategic resource at every
step of the New Product Development (NPD) process. With customer satisfaction as
the driver, the guiding philosophy is to assess the magnitude and complexity of each
program’s information needs, then go through the hoops of the development process as
quickly as possible. An initial concept is developed through five steps: selection of
powertrain, defining the model as two-door, four-door, etc., development of the vehicle
within the product team, final styling, and production engineering to Job 1. The target
project team size that the company aims for ranges from about fifty people at the first
official program step to about five hundred for the last two steps.s So far, that level of
leanness has been difficult to achieve.
Ford employs a variety of approaches to establish targets and control programs
during the NPD process: benchmarking, milestones, checkpoints, simultaneous
processing, deliverables. There is no specific limit on timing, no “standard” length of
time for activities, merely a commitment to continuously improve the vehicle
development process.
Normal operations under World Class Timing include an annual product cycle
plan update and segment strategy update, as well as periodic segment reviews, typically
twice a year. Throughout these planning activities there is a greater emphasis on
meeting customer needs, overcoming a reputation for dated products, and generating
visionary, yet marketable, new-vehicle concepts, through comprehensive, timely market
analysis and brainstorming. The approach is to understand the “voice of the customer”.
Towards that end, Ford is attempting to make better use of such management
techniques as Quality Function Deployment (QFD) to determine what combinations of
4Ford Motor Company World Class Process Group and The Emdicium Group, Inc., YYortdCl~
9Ve~ieWR~on AQ, November 15, 1992, p. 3.
5Kathy Jackson, “Strategy at Ford: develop cars fast,” ~ve News , November 16, 1992, p. 1,42.
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features andaRfibutes arereally impotiant tothe vehicle purchaser. Ithas developeda
Quick QFD methodology by which design teams can assess a twenty-by-twenty matrix
of features and amass meaningful data rather than the more common, yet more
cumbersome, one hundred-by-one hundred matrix. Seven years ago, Ford also created
a Breakthrough Products Team, an interdisciplinary group of about thirty product
development specialists, designers, engineers, and manufacturing experts. According
to one account, the group has not consistently lived up to its name, but has generated a
number of valuable ideas related to product development issues.6 For its efforts, Ford
would ultimately like to be able to target and fill a vehicle niche within three years.
Several Japanese manufacturers have demonstrated this level of performance when
creating new models that use structural elements and component systems from current
vehicle platforms. They are approaching this level of performance for completely new
platforms.
As Ford illustrates in its World Class Timing Overview, the vehicle development
process may be reduced to four basic sets of activities: planning, design, development,
and production. These sets of activities are broken into a series of milestones, each
with customer-driven targets and specific customer, business, and technical
deliverables. Across the entire set of activities, the company aims to achieve a fast
cycle time, which it defines as “the ongoing ability to identify, satisfy, and be paid for
meeting the customer’s needs faster than anyone else”.
A complete cycle of World Class Timing will take a vehicle from concept to
customer in the “minimum possible time. The cycle includes pre-program definition
activities including powertrain declaration, program definition, and a sequence of nine
steps culminating in a program status review six months after production Job #l. The
sequence is outlined as follows for a vehicle with a single bodystyle. [Ford currently
presses hard to beat the full, five-year development cycle described below.]
\\
6Alex Ta~l~r III, “Iacocca’s Minivan: How Chrysler succeeded in creating one of the rTIOSt profitable
products of the decade,” w, May 30,1994, p. 63,66.
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World Class Timina Milestones
~owetirain Declared
60 MonthsbeforeJob#l
%ograrn Definition -
43 Months before Job #1
- <PT>
<PD>
%ograrn Implementation - <P!>
37 Months before Job #1
rheme Decision - <TD>
33 Months before Job #1
rheme Confirmation - <TC>
31 Months before Job #1
Program Confirmation - <PC>
24Months before Job #1
Prototype Readiness - <PR>
21 Months before Job #1
Sign-Off - <SO>
7 Months before Job #1
Launch Readiness - <LR>
3 Months before Job #1
Job #1 - <Jl>
Program Status - <PS>
6 Months after Job #1
Segment Director declaration of
powertrains for proposed vehicle program
and initiation of funding for new or major-
change engine or transmission programs.
Board of Directors Product Planning
Committee approval of program strategic
intent, range of alternatives, and total
vehicle targets. Approval of Segment
Strategy at the January President’s
Meeting and the March Final Cycle Plan
Meeting.
Board of Directors and Product Planning
Committee approval, with NAAO Executive
Committee consensus of a single
architecture within approved targets.
Design Committee approval of a single
Interior/Exterior Theme. Release of
additional long-lead engineering funds if
needed.
Vehicle Program Team confirms 100°/0
feasibility of InterforExtenor Surface.
Vehicle Program Team confirms Theme
can meet targets.
Commitment of total organization to
meeting program objectives on 18-panel
charts. Program Planning Committee
approves program objectkes and Board 01
Directors approves total program funds
after NAAO Executive Committee reaches
consensus on program.
Program Managets approval of Job #1
design, the manufacturing processes, and
Purchasing plans.
Certification by Program Manager that the
vehicle product development and
manufacturing capability meet Job #1
customer requirements and quality,
emissions, and other objectives.
Program Managets approval of the start c
the integrated launch. Completed
demonstration of Design, Process, and
Quality Intent for parts and equipment.
Integrated launch completed. Program
Manager approval to start mass
production.
Program Manager reports Program Status
versus 18-panel objectives and customer
assessment of quality objectives.
Integration of lessons learned for
continuous process improvements.
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Organizational and Process intent -Regardless of the organizational changes
that might come about due to the creation of Ford Automotive Operations and its five
Vehicle Program Centers, the basic activities of the World Class Timing process are
likely to remain intact. They are a good foundation for an SVO initiative. Through World
Class Timing, Ford, like Chrysler, has consciously attempted to place vehicle design
authority in the hands of a collocated team rather than at the mercy of component
groups in many locations. [t differs from Chrysler in the scope of activities assigned to
the team. The collocated Ford teams are expected to do a lot of the planning, some of
the systems engineering, and only a small amount of component engineering for each
vehicle. Ford’s view is that systems and component engineering are best left back in
home organizations to foster smart, yet commonly usable designs. Now a parl of FAO,
its Automotive Components Group (ACG) is one of a number of Ford units that is very
deep in terms of the number of systems developed in-house. ACG manages
approximately thirly systems at the vehicle module level and 120 at the next lower
component level.
Core technology groups are doing more strategic technology work such as
putting basic system specifications in place for use across multiple projects. When the
complexity of vehicle integration issues dictates, crossfunctional module teams are
brought together to drive the technology into a given vehicle program. For example, the
new Taurus has a brand new steering gear. There is a core technology group
developing the component for general use along with a chassis group working on its
specific integration into the Taurus.
Several Ford product development managers said that in the future they
expected collocated teams to petiorm more planning and systems engineering work
prior to component engineering in functional areas. They expected increasing
dedication, but not necessarily collocation, of functional people to the vehicle
development teams. They recognized an increasing need to “cross chimneys” at the
supervisor Ievei to better foster interdisciplinary functional cooperation and coordination
with the teams. Toward that end, former program managers are being moved to
operations roles in functional areas. The company has additionally addressed the issue
of not having designated team champions upstream in the corporate managerial
hierarchy by placing vice president-level executives in charge of each of the Vehicle
Centers. initial indications are that the five executives in this position wili become the
equivalent of managers that Toyota has placed over its “heavyweight” project
managers, its shusas.
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The Special Vehicle Operations Model
The Special Vehicle Operations model is an optimized simultaneous engineering
and manufacturing environment. It attempts to integrate a long list of innovative product
development and manufacturing practices under one organization. Brief descriptions of
some of the major elements are as follows:
Virtwd Emerpise. There must be seamless, intensive linkages between the most
creative and advanced technical personnel within the automaker and its supplier
community. Where appropriate, there should also be customer links as well. There
must be an information technology architecture that allows any project participant to
view and comment on any relevant issue to help maximize cross-functional participation
and promote overlapped design phases. The aim is to maximize real-time involvement
in integrated, concurrent product and process development and provide decision-
makers with assistance in choosing from project alternatives. In addition to the
expected CAD, CAM, CAE, DFM, and DFA resources, the electronic environment
should include capable project management software that supports front-end planning,
AHP, resource-allocation, critical path scheduling, “what-if” technical and financial
analysis, and process engineering/reengineering for multiple, simultaneous projects.T
Other IT requirements include systems for design simulation and efficient logistical
tracking. The OEM must support design data exchange with the supplier by adopting
such conventions as STEP, the Standard for the Exchange of Product model data. The
overall intent is to provide for interaction within the physical confines of SVO facility, at
all other participants’ work locations, and at other parts of the company that will benefit
from knowledge transfers.
Flexib/e Manufacturing System. A true FMS includes a number of sub-elements and
should be integrated with the virtual enterprise. A digital manufacturing process system
is the computer nerve center of the production operation. An effective digital
manufacturing process system can decrease manufacturing lead time by up to twenty-
five percent and improve plant utilization rates by providing such features as: virtual
plant layout, construction, and modification; animated simulation of the assembly line in
action including equipment activity, logistics, and materials handling; automated
scheduling of production, maintenance, and product/plant changeover; and
manufacturing decision support. The fabrication machinery in the SVO plant itself
should primarily consist of more basic, robust machinety rather than purpose-built,
specialty machines and unique fixtures. This will better support more easily
reprogrammed, modular manufacturing cells rather than a relatively inflexible dedicated
production line. According to Mikio Kitano, president and CEO of Toyota Manufacturing
USA, the “New Assembly Line” must support three precepts: “arranging the vehicle’s
structure, function, and assembly to promote the workers’ understanding of the nature of
their work and place in the entire team”; demonstrating with each subsequent design a
maturation of current steps, not a replacement of them; and the use of machines and
7Ste~henW-T.,O’Keeffe,“ChwslerandAnemis:strikingBackwith TheViper,”~.
December1994,p. 15-7.
9
equipment to compensate for the physical weaknesses and limited range of worker
movement.e “
Set-based design versus Point-based design. Toyota’s experience indicates that the
design of a vehicle can occur more rapidly and be more responsive to changing
customer requirements when it is built up from a set of flexible component specifications
and known design alternatives that are demonstrated on a relatively large number of
prototypes. The developed systems and concepts can be mixed or matched in a final
vehicle specification and also provide more data for future consideration or use. The
more widely used, point-based method produces a set of sequential decisions that
rigidly fix a design much earlier in the development process, limiting opportunities for
market or technology-driven change.g Instead of many possible solutions to a problem,
point-based design generates one solution with greater market risk. Set-based design
helps lower this risk by allowing the automaker to set final specifications as close to
market introduction as possible without compromising quality or the Job 1 date. It does
force the automaker towards improvements in digital modeling, prototyping, and
standardized component design that can quickly be applied to new projects.
Kozokeikaku, or K-4 development. This Japanese term refers to a development
philosophy extensively used at Toyota and is, “a prescribed method of looking at vehicle
engineering relationships and how the whole structure goes together.”lo In a nutshell,
the practice involves understanding the history of a design and leveraging that
knowledge with each subsequent use in a new product. Development teams design for
the future with an extensive, critical understanding of current and past designs.
Designers and engineers have a firm, quantifiable understanding of how a new design
reflects a number of component and system variations from an existing design even
before final component drawing, tooling, or preparation of prototypes. The degree to
which the Big Three US automakers and other firms avoid beneficial reuse of system
and component families is a major reason that these firms are hard-pressed to match
the product cycles of competitors that build on each preceding vehicle generation.
Effective customer and supplier databases. The SVO must have the capability to
anticipate technological and market opportunities. Maintaining active databases helps
the organization look outward and manage the strategic and tactical planning underlying
all operations. In pafiicular, this knowledge capability supports improved concurrent
engineering of products and their attendant manufacturing processes. A cross-
functional team of generalists and specialists should habitually sift disparate streams of
information from within and without the auto industry to target continuous improvement
activities.’l
Clear Project Imperatives. The success of the SVO concept is dependent upon
preserving its “marketable production experiment” mindset. Each batch of vehicles
produced must ‘incorporate one or more clearly identifiable changes from past
development practice, either design content or production process. The intent is to
8Maflin,Sawyer,andSerge,“TowardsWorld-Class,”~ “ , September1995, p. 86.
9John McElroy, “Toyota’s ProductDevelopment paradox,” ~ , August 1994, p. 46,48.
1‘Martin, Sawyer, and Serge, “Towards Worf&Class,” p. 84.
11Michael J. Tracy et al, “Achieving agile manufacturing in the automotive industry,” ~
. .
~, November 1994, p. 22.
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enact a multi-project vision for precedent-setiing vehicle development prowess, a vision
that can be disseminated to the rest of the company by example and by effective
transfer of knowledge learned. Heavyweight program management, in the form of a
chief engineer or vehicle executive, is important to provide an effective arbiter of design
decisions when consensus is not attainable and to make sure that an empowered
development team keeps to each project’s imperatives.
Personnel Structure and Movement Policies. To insure that those imperatives move
out from the SVO after each completed project, a rigorous system of effective personnel
staffing and movement should be in place. There should be a very small staff of long-
term SVO participants who are dedicated to facilities and information management,
personnel orientation and training, and maintaining the living and recorded archives of
SVO. A small group of vehicle executives would be expected to spend no more than
about five years each managing a series of projects then returning to other areas of the
company. The majority of employees would rotate through the SVO, participating on
one-to-three specific projects. Everyone would be expected to participate in open
debriefs of each project after completion.
Niche-Vehicle/Niche-Market Orientation. The Special Vehicle Operations plant should
build vehicles to supply both Niche-Vehicle (NV) and Niche-Market (NM) requirements
while showcasing the corporation’s advanced engineering and styling capabilities.1z In
fulfilling NV requirements, the plant should produce completely new vehicles that might
be outside Ford’s normal portfolio of volume offerings as well as technology-intensive
derivatives of existing vehicles. An example of the former might be an electric citycar or
a special run of active suspension vehicles, while an example of the latter might be a
run of aluminum structure versions of the new Ford Taurus. Niche-market status implies
that no single vehicle run would exceed perhaps twenty thousand vehicles in a year.
Such a limit encourages the SVO to always be looking toward the next project; truly
successful designs could be ported to other plants. It also helps allay some financial
risk in that a premium can be charged for collectible vehicles and the logistics of
suppofiing them can be more easily managed using outside suppliers. It will likely be
advisable to market SVO products through specially certified Ford dealers that have
very high customer satisfaction scores. These dealers would be qualified to act as
antenna shops, bringing customers into the SVO’S design innovation process.la
Customers would help gather technical-market research and test concepts.
The above “features list” is just a small portion of the design and policy attributes
needed to implement an SVO. The technology management challenge is to insure that
the wealth of structures, systems, and tools do not get in the way of rapid vehicle
development. The right people, the right tools, and the right projects form a critical
mass. The technology “keepers” within the company must establish an appropriate list
of development ideas to test, presumably based on Expert Choice or similar means of
12Ray ~ndecker, “Niche vehiCkM” _tlve 1~ June 1995, p. 62.
13~tonio s. Lauglaug, ~echnical-Market Research -- Get Customers to Collaborate in Developing
Products,” ~ae p!- . vol. 26, No. 2,1993, p. 81-2.
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choosing from alternative projects. The SVO plant is not just a pilot production plant
that can produce a small run of prototypes orpre-production vehicles to validate a
random idea. It is a complete, yet lean vehicle development center that suppofls the
testing of concepts which have potentially strategic importance.
Bringing technology innovations and applications to mainstream corporate use is
imperative if Ford or any other automaker is to remain world-class. The SVO concept
can be an effective means of feasibility testing, introducing, and transferring new
technologies before they are overtaken by still newer technologies. The short-term
nature of each individual SVO production project coupled with the repetitive nature of
on-going SVO activities will greatly assist the automaker in mastering the technology
project management cycle of invention, development and innovation, and
obsolescence.14 As the SVO undertakes a variety of production experiments, it will be a
critical source of feedback and feedforward information to the rest of the company’s
vehicle development efforts.
\
. .
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presented at Project 2000, Jubilee Seminar,NorwegianInstituteof Technology, Trondheirn,No~ay, 1
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